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Life after Vu: Manner of Computer 
Searches and Search Protocols 
Gerald Chan* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Computers have been an indispensable part of our lives for at least 
two decades. Given the extent of our dependency on computers and the 
vast amounts of information that they contain, it was inevitable that they 
would become the focal point of criminal investigations. The only 
surprise is that it took so long for search and seizure law to join the party. 
Having repeatedly granted leave and issued sweeping judgments in this 
area in the past few years, the Supreme Court of Canada appears to be 
making up for lost time. 
Police searches and seizures are primarily regulated by section 8 of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Section 8 guarantees 
everyone the right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure,
1
 
and its purpose is to protect privacy.
2
 To be considered reasonable, a 
search or seizure must: (i) be authorized by a law; (ii) that law must itself 
be reasonable; and (iii) the search or seizure must be carried out in a 
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1  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
2  Hunter v. Southam Inc. (sub nom. Canada (Combines Investigation Acts, Director of 
Investigation and Research) v. Southam Inc.), [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at 159 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hunter v. Southam”]. It should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court left 
open the possibility that the purpose of section 8 of the Charter is broader: “I would be wary of 
foreclosing the possibility that the right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure must 
protect interests beyond the right of privacy, but for the purposes of the present appeal I am satisfied 
that its protections go at least that far.”  
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reasonable manner.
3
 The first two requirements can be further specified 
with reference to the Supreme Court’s holding in Hunter v. Southam, 
which imposed a presumptive requirement that the search or seizure be 
pre-authorized by an impartial arbiter on the basis of reasonable and 
probable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed and that the 
search or seizure will reveal evidence of that crime.
4
 Searches or seizures 
that do not satisfy this requirement of prior authorization are prima facie 
unreasonable.  
Therefore, section 8 of the Charter will in most cases achieve its 
purpose of protecting privacy by imposing two prophylactic rules. First, 
the police must obtain prior authorization for the search or seizure, which 
will typically be in the form of a search warrant.
5 
Second, even where a 
warrant has been issued, the search must be conducted in a reasonable 
manner.
6 
The first rule prevents unjustified intrusions while the second 
rule regulates the extent of the intrusion.
7
 
In three important cases, the Supreme Court of Canada applied these 
long-established, general principles of section 8 of the Charter to the 
digital world of computer searches. In R. v. Morelli, the Court wrote, that 
“[i]t is difficult to imagine a search more intrusive, extensive, or invasive 
of one’s privacy than the search and seizure of a personal computer”; and 
it is therefore important for the police to ensure that they have laid a 
proper basis for any warrant authorizing such a search.
8
 Two years later 
in R. v. Cole, the Court held that the same principles apply to work 
computers, “at least where personal use is permitted or reasonably 
expected”; and the police must therefore obtain a warrant before 
searching the contents of such computers.
9
 Just last year in Vu, the Court 
held that a warrant may only be relied on to search the contents of a 
                                                                                                                                  
3  R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J. No. 15, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, at 278 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Collins”]. 
4  Hunter v. Southam, supra, note 2, at 160. 
5  Id., at 160. There are exceptions to the requirement of prior authorization. For instance, 
the police may conduct a search of a person and his or her immediate surroundings incident to a 
lawful arrest: R. v. Caslake, [1998] S.C.J. No. 3, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 51, at para. 15 (S.C.C.). Whether 
and to what extent this exception applies to digital devices such as computers and cell phones will be 
determined by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Fearon, [2013] S.C.C.A. No. 141 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Fearon”]. The case was heard on May 23, 2014 and is currently under reserve. The 
author was co-counsel to the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association in this case along with his 
partner, Nader R. Hasan.  
6  Collins, supra, note 3, at 278. 
7  R. v. Vu, [2013] S.C.J. No. 60, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 657, at para. 22 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Vu”]. 
8  [2010] S.C.J. No. 8, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 253, at paras. 2-4 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Morelli”].  
9  [2012] S.C.J. No. 53, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 34, at para. 1 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Cole”]. 
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computer where it specifically authorizes a computer search; a warrant 
that only authorizes the search of a residence in which a computer 
happens to be found is inadequate.
10
  
These three cases provide useful guidance on the constitutional 
regulation of computer searches under section 8 of the Charter. Each of 
them, however, is concerned mainly with the first prophylactic rule 
requiring prior judicial authorization. This is, in many ways, the easier of 
the two rules. The question of whether and how the police should be 
required to obtain a warrant is relatively simple because it does not 
engage new processes. The police must decide whether the search of a 
particular computer (personal or work) engages a reasonable expectation 
of privacy; if it does, then the police must obtain a warrant before 
searching it. In order to do so, the investigating officer must swear an 
Information to Obtain setting out reasonable grounds to believe that a 
search of the computer will afford evidence of crime. The processes 
leading up to the obtaining of a warrant to search a computer are largely 
the same as they are for warrants to search other places and receptacles 
(e.g., a house or car). 
The second prophylactic rule governing the manner of search raises 
thornier problems when applied in the digital world. After decades of 
manner of search litigation, certain rules have emerged to govern 
searches and seizures in the physical world: for example, the police must 
ordinarily give notice before forcing entry; the police may use reasonable 
force to gain entry; and upon entry, the police are entitled to control the 
premises to ensure their safety and prevent the destruction of evidence.
 
None of these rules, however, maps over easily to the digital world. 
There, the execution of a search warrant raises novel questions:  
(1) Once the police have obtained a warrant to search a computer, can 
they look through every single file and folder in the computer?  
(2) Are they limited to reviewing certain types of files?  
(3) Should they be restricted to searching by certain keywords?  
(4) What happens if they stumble upon evidence of one crime (e.g., 
images of child pornography) in the course of searching for evidence 
of another crime (e.g., documentation of fraud)?  
                                                                                                                                  
10  Vu, supra, note 7, at para. 3. 
436 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2014), 67 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
The Supreme Court of Canada has not yet had to grapple directly with 
any of these questions. But there is no doubt that these issues represent the 
next frontier of computer search and seizure law. In Vu, the Court invited 
counsel to engage in vigorous manner of search litigation in the computer 
context by emphasizing that a warrant to search a device does not give the 
police “a licence to scour the devic[e] indiscriminately”.
11
 Instead, if the 
police, in the course of their search, realize that there is no reason to search 
a particular program or file, the law of search and seizure would require 
them not to do so.
12
 Moreover, the Court noted that while manner of search 
is generally reviewed after the fact,
13
 issuing justices may find it 
“necessary and practical” to impose search protocols (i.e., ex ante 
conditions) in certain cases.
14
 
This paper seeks to build on these statements and imagine the post-
Vu world of computer search and seizure law. Section 1 of Part II will 
summarize Vu and the propositions for which it stands. Section 2 will 
take up Vu’s invitation to carefully examine the manner of computer 
searches and draw on lower court decisions (in both Canada and the 
United States) in an attempt to tease out some general principles. Section 3 
will analyze the issue of search protocols and when it might be 
appropriate — and, indeed, constitutionally required — for authorizing 
justices to impose ex ante conditions to regulate the manner of computer 
searches. The paper will conclude by urging the courts to adopt three 
general propositions to control the scope of computer searches so that 
they do not render the warrant requirement meaningless: 
(1) The courts should carefully examine the methodology used by the 
police to determine whether they were faithful to the objectives of 
the warrant in their execution of the search. 
(2) The courts should resist categorical claims that every file on a computer 
must be examined, even if only cursorily, to determine its relevance.  
(3) The courts should require search protocols to be set out in the 
warrant in cases involving heightened privacy risks (e.g., searches 
involving potentially privileged information and confidential 
intellectual property; searches aimed at networks of computers; and 
searches targeting innocent parties).  
                                                                                                                                  
11  Id., at para. 61. 
12  Id. 
13  Id., at para. 55. 
14  Id., at para. 62. 
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II. BEYOND A WARRANT REQUIREMENT:  
WHERE DO WE GO FROM VU? 
1.  Vu: What Did the Court Hold? 
In Vu, the police obtained a warrant authorizing the search of a 
residence for evidence of theft of electricity, including documentation 
identifying the owners and/or occupants of the residence. The warrant 
authorized the police to seize, among other things “documentation 
identifying ownership and/or occupancy of the property” relevant to an 
investigation of the offence.
15
 It did not, however, specifically authorize 
the search or seizure of any computers or cell phones.  
The police executed this warrant and discovered two computers and 
a cell phone in the residence. They searched these devices, and these 
searches led to evidence that Mr. Vu was the occupant of the residence.
16
  
At trial, Mr. Vu claimed that these searches violated his rights under 
section 8 of the Charter and asked the judge to exclude the evidence. The 
trial judge found that police were not authorized to search the computers 
and cell phone because those devices were not specifically mentioned in 
the warrant. The trial judge excluded most of the evidence found as a 
result of these searches and acquitted the accused.
17
 
The British Columbia Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal 
and ordered a new trial. It held that a computer is no different from “a 
four-drawer filing cabinet” when it comes to search and seizure law.
18
 
The general rule, with respect to physical objects, is that a warrant 
authorizing a search of a specific location for specific things authorizes 
the executing officers to conduct a reasonable examination of anything at 
that location within which the specified things might be found. “Just as it 
cannot be said that a warrant to search for documentary evidence relating 
to a fraudulent scheme would not apply to a four-drawer filing cabinet, 
the existence of which the police learn of after entering a residence,” the 
Court of Appeal wrote, “neither can it be said that such a warrant would 




                                                                                                                                  
15  Id., at para. 12. 
16  Id., at para. 4. 
17  R. v. Vu, [2010] B.C.J. No. 1777, at paras. 60-69 (B.C.S.C.). 
18  R. v. Vu, [2011] B.C.J. No. 2487, at para. 63 (B.C.C.A.). 
19  Id., at para. 63. 
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The Supreme Court of Canada disagreed. In a unanimous judgment 
written by Cromwell J., the Court rejected the notion that a computer was 
no different from a physical container. “Computers differ in important 
ways from the receptacles governed by the traditional framework,” 
Cromwell J. wrote, “and computer searches give rise to particular 
privacy concerns that are not sufficiently addressed by that approach.”
20
 
Because computers raise unique privacy concerns, specific prior 
authorization must be obtained in order for a computer search to comply 
with section 8 of the Charter.  
The Court delineated four important ways in which computers are 
different.  
First, computers can “store immense amounts of information, some 
of which, in the case of personal computers, will touch the ‘biographical 
core of personal information’”.
21
 An 80-gigabyte desktop drive — and 
commercial hard drives have far greater capacities — can store the 
equivalent of 40 million pages of text. Therefore, as the Ontario Court of 
Appeal put it in R. v. Mohamad, a computer “can be a repository for an 
almost unlimited universe of information”.
22
 This information touches on 
the most intimate aspects of our private lives.
23
  
Second, a computer is, as Alan D. Gold has put it, a “fastidious 
record keeper”.
24
 Computers contain information that is automatically 
generated, often without the user knowing. Most web browsers, for 
instance, are programmed to automatically retain information about the 
websites that a user has visited in recent weeks in order to help the user 
retrace his or her cybernetic steps. This information can also, however, 
enable investigators to “access intimate details about a user’s interests, 




Third, a computer retains files and data even after users think they 
have destroyed them.
26
 When a user marks a file as deleted, the operating  
 
                                                                                                                                  
20  Vu, supra, note 7, at para. 2. 
21  Id., at para. 41. 
22  [2004] O.J. No. 279, 69 O.R. (3d) 481, at para. 43 (Ont. C.A.), cited in Vu, id., at para. 41. 
23  Orin Kerr, “Searches and Seizures in a Digital World (2005) 119 Harv. L. Rev. 531, at 
569 [hereinafter “Kerr”]. See also R. v. Morelli, supra, note 8, at paras. 3, 105; R. v. Cole, supra, 
note 9, at para. 47; R. v. Jones, [2011] O.J. No. 4388, at para. 37 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Jones”]. 
24  Alan D. Gold, “Applying Section 8 in the Digital World: Seizures and Searches”, 
prepared for the 7th Annual Six-Minute Criminal Defence Lawyer (June 9, 2007), at para. 3. 
25  Vu, supra, note 7, at para. 42. 
26  Id., at para. 43. 
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system simply goes to the “Master File Table” and marks that particular 
file’s clusters available for future use by other files. If the operating 
system does not reuse that cluster for another file by the time the 
computer is analyzed, the file marked for deletion will still be available 
for examination. Even if another file has been assigned to that cluster, a 
large amount of data can be recovered from the computer’s “slack 
space”, i.e., space within the cluster left temporarily unused.
27
 In this 
way, the computer’s “delete” key is more aptly described as a “hide” key. 
Every inappropriate image, file or e-mail the user has ever viewed 
(even accidentally) will likely reside somewhere on the computer for 
years and be subject to examination by investigators no matter how 
quickly it was deleted. 
Fourth, computers are rarely stand-alone, self-contained entities. 
When connected to the Internet, computers serve as “portals to an almost 
infinite amount of information that is shared between different users and 
is stored almost anywhere in the world”.
28
 Similarly, computers can be 
connected to networks or servers which link them to other computers.
29
 
This is often the case with computers found in a workplace. Consider, for 
instance, the single rogue trader in a multi-national financial firm who is 
suspected of engaging in insider trading from his workplace computer. 
A police officer with access to that employee’s computer would be able 
to access the company’s entire network, which might span five 
continents and contain the private files of hundreds of employees as well 
as sensitive information about the firm’s clients.  
These “numerous and striking differences” between computers and 
traditional receptacles, the Court held, call for “distinctive treatment 
under s. 8 of the Charter”.
30
 It is not enough for a warrant to authorize 
the search of a place in which a computer is found; the warrant must 
specifically authorize the search of a computer within that place. Only 
then, the Court held, can one be sure that “the authorizing justice has 
considered the full range of the distinctive privacy concerns raised by 
computer searches and, having done so, has decided that this threshold 
has been reached in the circumstances of a particular proposed search”.
31
 
                                                                                                                                  
27  Id., at para. 43, citing Kerr, supra, note 23, at 542. 
28  Vu., id., at para. 44.  
29  Id. 
30  Id., at para. 45. 
31  Id., at para. 47. 
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The Court then went further and addressed a specific submission 
made by the intervener, British Columbia Civil Liberties Association (the 
“BCCLA”).
32
 The BCCLA had argued that it was not enough for a search 
warrant to simply include the word “computer”; rather, the unique 
privacy concerns raised by computers require police officers to submit, 
and justices to authorize, search protocols (i.e., ex ante conditions) in 
advance of the search. These protocols would limit the scope of the 
computer search in order to ensure that, as much as possible, only that 




The Court did not accept this argument in its entirety, i.e., it held that 
search protocols will not be constitutionally required in every case.
34
 
The manner of search, the Court held, is generally to be reviewed after 
the fact.
35
 If the target of the search believes that police have exceeded 
the bounds of reasonableness in executing a search warrant on her 
computer, she may bring an application to seek Charter relief — and the 
reasonableness of the manner of search will then be determined on 
ex post review. Detailed rules governing the scope of the search generally 
do not need to be proposed by the police and spelled out in the warrant in 
advance of the search.  
Importantly, however, the Court emphasized that the manner of search 
will be closely scrutinized on ex post review. Justice Cromwell wrote: 
By now it should be clear that my finding that a search protocol was 
not constitutionally required in this case does not mean that once police 
had the warrant in hand, they had a licence to scour the devices 
indiscriminately. They were bound, in their search, to adhere to the rule 
that the manner of search must be reasonable. Thus, if, in the course of 
their search, the officers realized that there was in fact no reason to 
search a particular program or file on the device, the law of search and 
seizure would require them not to do so.
36
 
Moreover, the Court left the door open for search protocols to be 
imposed in certain cases. The Court noted that as the case law develops, 
“after-the-fact review may lead courts to set out specific rules according  
 
                                                                                                                                  
32  The author was co-counsel to the BCCLA in this case along with his partner, Nader R. Hasan.  
33  Vu, supra, note 7, at para. 53. 
34  Id., at para. 54. 
35  Id., at para. 55. 
36  Id., at para. 61. 
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to which searches must be conducted”, which can then be imported into 
search protocols.
37
 In particular, the Court wrote that issuing justices may 
find it “necessary and practical” to impose search protocols in cases 
involving “confidential intellectual property or potentially privileged 
information”.
38
 In these cases, protocols could be imposed when police 
first request authorization to search the computer. Alternatively, issuing 
justices may prefer a “two-stage approach” where they would first issue 
a warrant authorizing the seizure of the computer and then have police 
return for an additional authorization to search the seized device, which 
would include a protocol that would limit the scope of the search.
39
 
Finally, the Court made it clear that it was not “foreclos[ing] the 
possibility that our developing understanding of computer searches and 
changes in technology may make it appropriate to impose search 
protocols in a broader range of cases in the future”.
40
 
2.  Manner of Search: How Will This Be Regulated? 
The immediate lesson from Vu is that police officers must obtain a 
computer-specific warrant before searching the contents of any 
computers. But what does this mean beyond inserting the word 
“computer” in the warrant? The police must establish reasonable grounds 
to believe that a search of the computer will afford evidence of an 
offence before they can obtain a computer-specific warrant, but this will 
not be difficult to do in most cases. Given the ubiquity of computers and 
the immense amount and variety of information that they typically 
contain, the police should not have a hard time explaining why a 
computer will afford evidence of crime — especially if they already have 
reasonable grounds to believe that the place in which the computer is 
located contains evidence of crime.
41
  
Beyond establishing the requisite grounds to search a computer and 
obtaining a warrant to do so, Vu makes it clear that most of the heavy 
lifting will be done on ex post review when the target challenges the  
 
                                                                                                                                  
37  Id., at para. 55. 
38  Id., at para. 62. 
39  Id. 
40  Id. 
41  Lily Robinton, “Courting Chaos: Conflicting Guidance from Courts Highlights the Need 
for Clearer Rules to Govern the Search and Seizure of Digital Evidence” (2010) 12 Yale J.L. & Tech 
311, at 321 [hereinafter “Robinton”]. 
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execution of the warrant under section 8 of the Charter. Only then will the 
manner in which the police searched the computer — e.g., the number of 
files they looked at, when they looked at them and for how long — be 
measured against the standard for reasonableness under section 8.  
In the physical world context, litigation over the manner of search 
has generated several rules for the police to follow. Before forcing 
entry, the police must ordinarily give: (i) notice of presence, by 
knocking or ringing the doorbell; (ii) notice of authority, by identifying 
themselves as law enforcement; and (iii) notice of purpose, by stating a 
lawful reason for entry.
42
 The police may use reasonable force to gain 
entry.
43
 Upon entry, the police are entitled to “control the premises” to 
ensure their safety and prevent the destruction of evidence.
44
 Beyond 
controlling the premises, the police are not entitled to detain individuals 
simply because they happen to be found at the premises being searched, 




These rules provide useful guidance for police officers and valuable 
protections for the privacy rights of individuals by, as much as possible, 
establishing bright lines beyond which the police must not go. The 
project of defining similar rules in the context of computer searches, 
however, is only beginning. Computers are different from ordinary 
places and receptacles and require a distinctive set of protections. 
Because of the four distinctive traits of computers explained in Vu, 
computer searches raise two unique challenges for manner of search 
regulation. 
First, data are intermingled. Even where there are reasonable grounds 
to believe that a computer contains evidence of crime, there is a strong 
likelihood that the computer contains an “intermingling” of that evidence 
with intensely personal information that the police have no reasonable 
grounds to search or seize.
46
 The same computer (or even the same folder 
                                                                                                                                  
42  R. v. Cornell, [2010] S.C.J. No. 31, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 142, at para. 43 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Cornell”]. 
43  R. v. Genest, [1989] S.C.J. No. 5, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 59 (S.C.C.); R. v. Gimson, [1991] 
S.C.J. No. 104, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 692 (S.C.C.). 
44  R. v. Silveira, [1995] S.C.J. No. 38, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 297 (S.C.C.); R. v. Strachan, [1988] 
S.C.J. No. 94, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 980 (S.C.C.); R. v. Learning, [2010] O.J. No. 3092, at paras. 75-76 
(Ont. S.C.J.). 
45  Laporte v. Laganière J.S.P., [1972] Q.J. No. 3518, 29 D.L.R. (3d) 351 (Que. S.C.);  
R. v. Thompson, [1996] O.J. No. 1501 (Ont. Prov. Div.). 
46  See, e.g., Cole, supra, note 9, at para. 88 (illegal photographs intermingled with 
photographs of the accused’s wife); In the Matter of the Search of 3817 W. West End, 321 F. 
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within the computer) which contains fraudulent business records may 
also contain intimate medical records.  
Second, the ordinary search and seizure process is inverted. In the 
physical world, physical realities limit the scope of the search. If, for 
example, the warrant authorizes the search and seizure of rifles, the 
police cannot reasonably search in a jewelry box. Computers, however, 
invert the process; the normal process of “search” and then selective 
“seizure” is turned on its head. Because of the difficulties of conducting 
an on-site search of computers, the police frequently seize computers 
without any prior review of their contents.
47
 Police then take a mirror 
image of the entire hard drive so that they can search through its 
contents.
48
 As a result, over-seizure is a particularly acute problem.
49
 




In light of these difficulties, how should the manner of a computer 
search be governed in order to strike the right balance between the 
interests of law enforcement and the privacy rights of individuals? While 
the jurisprudence is still in its infancy, some broad principles can be 
extracted from the lower court decisions in both the pre- and post-Vu 
eras; and some general observations can be made. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in Jones is an important 
starting point. In that case, the police obtained a warrant to search the 
accused’s home and computers for evidence of fraud. In the course of 
the computer search, the police discovered images of child pornography. 
The reviewing officer then conducted a full search of the hard drive, 
                                                                                                             
Supp.2d 953, at 958 (N.D. Ill. 2004) [hereinafter “West End”]; United States v. Otero, 563 F.3d 
1127, at 1132 (10th Cir. 2009). 
47  West End, id., at 958. 
48  Cole, supra, note 9, at para. 5; R. v. Little, [2009] O.J. No. 3278, at para. 137 (Ont. S.C.J.) 
[hereinafter “Little”]; Kerr, supra, note 23, at 541. This has generally been found to be reasonable, 
although the courts have been careful not to foreclose the possibility that this technique may be 
unreasonable in a given case: Little, id., at para. 164. See also See Christina M. Schuck, “A Search 
for the Caselaw to Support the Computer Search Guidance in United States v. Comprehensive Drug 
Testing” (2012) 16 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 741, at 771 [hereinafter “Schuck”]. In R. v. Cross, [2007] 
O.J. No. 5384, at paras. 21-24 (Ont. S.C.J.), the Court held that imaging the hard drive was 
unreasonable because the warrant only authorized the police to search the computer for information 
concerning one e-mail. Similarly, in R. v. Beitel, [2011] O.J. No. 4331, at para. 29 (Ont. S.C.J.) 
[hereinafter “Beitel”], the Court held that imaging the hard drive was unreasonable because the 
computer contained sensitive and highly confidential information, such as the patient records of a 
psychiatrist. 
49  Jones, supra, note 23, at para. 68. 
50  United States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 966, at 975 (9th Cir. 2006). 
444 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2014), 67 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
including a search of video files that the officer would not have 
examined for the purposes of the fraud investigation.
51
 The Court of 
Appeal held that this went beyond the scope of the warrant. 
Writing for a unanimous panel, Blair J.A. dismissed the Crown’s 
argument that a computer is an indivisible object that, once lawfully seized 
pursuant to a warrant, can be subject to a full examination of all data stored 
therein.
52
 Instead, Blair J.A. adopted an objective-based approach for 
examining the manner of computer searches. “A computer search pursuant 
to a warrant,” Blair J.A. wrote, “must be related to the legitimate targets 
respecting which the police have established reasonable and probable 
grounds, as articulated in the warrant.”
53
 That is, the reasonableness of the 
search depends on whether the police are confining themselves to the 
objective of the warrant, which in this case was to authorize a search for 
evidence of fraud (and not child pornography).  
This approach can be contrasted with a methodology-based 
approach, in which the reasonableness of the search depends on whether 
the police are confining themselves to specific methods of searching a 
computer (e.g., keyword searches, searching only document files and not 
videos, etc.).
 54
 Justice Blair rejected this approach as impractical:  
The focus on the type of evidence being sought, as opposed to the type 
of files that may be examined, is helpful, it seems to me, particularly in 
cases where it may be necessary for the police to do a wide-ranging 
inspection of the contents of the computer in order to ensure that 




Justice Blair also considered the plain view doctrine and how it 
might apply in the computer search context. The plain view doctrine 
operates as an exception to the rule against warrantless seizures by 
allowing the police to seize evidence that falls outside the parameters of a 
warrant where: (i) the police are lawfully in the place where a search is being 
conducted; (ii) the incriminating nature of the evidence is immediately 
apparent; (iii) the evidence was discovered inadvertently; and (iv) no further 
                                                                                                                                  
51  Jones, supra, note 23, at paras. 8-11, 23-24. 
52  Id., at paras. 45-46. 
53  Id., at para. 42. 
54  See Stephen Guzzi, “Digital Searches and the Fourth Amendment: The Interplay 
Between the Plain View Doctrine and Search-Protocol Warrant Restrictions” (2012) 49 Am. Crim. 
L. Rev. 301. 
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exploratory search is conducted to find evidence of other crimes.
56
 Section 
489 of the Criminal Code provides the police with a similar seizure power.
57
  
Justice Blair applied the plain view doctrine to the facts of Jones and 
held that it permitted the officer to seize the images of child pornography 
that he initially encountered in his search of the computer for evidence of 
fraud. These images were inadvertently discovered in the course of a 
lawful search that was focused on the objective of the warrant. The plain 
view doctrine did not, however, allow the officer to then conduct a further 
exploratory search of the computer for evidence of child pornography.
58
 
This latter search was not inadvertent because the officer intentionally 
strayed from the objective of the warrant and embarked on a separate, 
unauthorized investigation. In this way, Blair J.A. reconciled the elements 
of the plain view doctrine with the objective-based approach to assessing 
reasonableness. 
Jones made a useful contribution to the development of manner of 
search law in the computer context by setting out some general contours of 
reasonableness. In rejecting the Crown’s “indivisible object” argument, 
Jones avoided an approach that would inevitably have led to a dramatic 
over-seizure in nearly every computer search case. In adopting an 
objective-based approach, Jones provided a framework within which the 
police can operate when conducting computer searches and a focal point 
for the courts when adjudicating the reasonableness of such searches. 
It is important to note that while Jones rejects a methodology-
based approach to determining reasonableness, the methodologies 
used by the police remain relevant insofar as they shed light on the 
subjective intent of the police in conducting the search. Three lower 
court decisions — each of which held that the manner of search was 
unreasonable — illustrate this point. 
                                                                                                                                  
56  Id., at para. 56. See also R. v. Spindloe, [2001] S.J. No. 266, 154 C.C.C. (3d) 8, at 29-37 
(Sask. C.A.); R. v. F. (L.), [2002] O.J. No. 2604, at paras. 28-34 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Law, [2002] S.C.J. 
No. 10, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 227, at para. 27 (S.C.C.). 
57  R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. While some have suggested that section 489 is simply a 
codification of the plain view doctrine, the prevailing view in Ontario is that it is not: see Jones,  
id., at para. 58; R. v. B. (E.), [2011] O.J. No. 1042, at paras. 75-78 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal 
refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 455 (S.C.C.); R. v. F. (L.), id., at para. 22. The key difference appears 
to be that the plain view exception requires the incriminating nature of the item seized to be 
“immediately apparent”, while s. 489 requires only that the police have reasonable grounds to 
believe that the item will afford evidence of an offence. In R. v. MacNeil, [2014] B.C.J. No. 740,  
at para. 97 (B.C.S.C.), however, the Court articulated an important limitation on the s. 489 seizure 
power: it cannot be used to authorize the seizure of items deliberately excluded by the search 
warrant. See also s. 11(6) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19.  
58  Jones, id., at paras. 65-70. 
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In Beitel, the police claimed that they were conducting a stolen 
property investigation and searched the computer to determine its true 
ownership.
59
 The investigating officer, however, testified that the first 
place he looked for ownership information was the recycling bin, where 
he restricted his search to picture files.
60
 Further, the officer did not 
examine the serial number of the computer or conduct any other 
independent inquiries to ascertain ownership. Based on this evidence, the 
Court concluded that the officer “proceeded in the manner he did in order 
to see if the computer contained child pornography, not to determine 
lawful ownership of the computer”.
61
 The officer’s methods were telling 
of his objective. The search was thus held to be unreasonable. 
In R. v. Perkins, the police obtained a warrant to search a computer 
for “system files and logs” and “internet activity” in order to obtain 
evidence in relation to the offence of theft of telecommunications.
62
 In 
executing the warrant, however, the reviewing officer began his search in 
the “lost files in the unallocated space, even though he knew that an 
easier source to find date and time of internet activity would be in the 
allocated space”. (The unallocated space of a computer is where files are 
sent after the user has deleted them, but before the computer requires that 
space to store additional data.) Further, the reviewing officer did not 
“change the default settings of EnCase [i.e., the forensic software he used 
to conduct the search] when he began his search, even though it is 
possible to a certain extent to limit the data scope and document scope of 
EnCase”. The reviewing officer was “aware of tools such as a filter 
which allows for customized searches and a lock box which prevents 
graphic images from popping up”, but he did not use these tools. Instead, 
he followed the same procedure as that which he typically used to search 
for child pornography. Again, the officer’s methods were telling of his 
objective. The search was thus held to be unreasonable.
63
 
In R. v. Boudreau-Fontaine, the police obtained a warrant to search 
the accused’s computer for evidence proving that he had accessed the 
Internet, which he was prohibited from doing by probation order.
64
 In the 
course of the computer search, the police discovered images of child 
pornography. The Quebec Court of Appeal held that the manner of search 
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60  Id., at para. 27. 
61  Id., at para. 31. 
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63  Id., at para. 106. 
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was unreasonable: “the prosecution offered no evidence that would 
indicate whether the agents were still executing the warrant when they 
discovered the pornographic materials, that is, that they were still 
searching for information demonstrating that the computer had been 
connected to the Internet”.
65
 Implicit in this statement is the assumption 
that a police officer searching a computer for evidence of Internet access 
would be able to find such evidence long before stumbling upon images 
of child pornography.  
These cases demonstrate that while the ultimate question in an 
objective-based approach concerns the subjective intent of the police, 
this intent can be inferred from the search methodology used by the 
police. More specifically, these cases suggest that the courts may 
effectively require the police to follow an “obvious to obscure” approach. 
As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit put it in United States 
v. Burgess, the officer must “first look in the most obvious places and as 
it becomes necessary to progressively move from the obvious to the 
obscure”.
66
 Failing to take such an approach may trigger an adverse 
inference that the police were in fact searching for evidence which falls 
outside the parameters of the warrant, i.e., evidence of another crime. 
Aside from articulating an objective-based approach to assessing 
reasonableness, Jones also contains some less helpful dicta about the 
permissible scope of computer searches. The most problematic dictum is 
the suggestion that the police may have to “examine any file or folder on 
the computer to reasonably accomplish [the] authorized search”.
67
 This 
statement was premised on the notion that electronic evidence may be 
“concealed” or “cleverly camouflaged” such that the only way to 
determine the true nature of files is to open and examine them, “at least 
                                                                                                                                  
65  Id., at para. 53. 
66  576 F.3d 1078, at 1094 (10th Cir. Wyo. 2009); Schuck, supra, note 48, at 779. The most 
recent example of the “obvious to obscure” approach can be found in R. v. Sop, [2014] O.J.  
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67  Jones, supra, note 23, at para. 44. 
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in a cursory fashion”.
68
 The police have made this assertion in a number 
of cases; it is inaccurate, but has frequently gone unchallenged.
69
  
The police have the means to determine the true nature of files 
without opening and examining them. In R. v. Sonne, for instance, the 
evidence showed that the forensic software used by the police (i.e., 
EnCase) was capable of determining whether the file type had been 
altered.
70
 The same was true in Ontario (Ministry of the Attorney 
General) v. Law Society of Upper Canada.
71
  
Indeed, many commentators have written about the ability of the 
police to conduct computer searches without opening files by searching 
based on “file headers” or “hash values”. A “file header” is an internal 
computer file identifier that tells the computer about the file. Even if 
someone tries to disguise an image file by giving it a name and 
extension that makes it look like a word processing document, for 
example, the computer and forensic software will not be fooled because 
the file header will reveal the true nature of the file.
72
 A “hash value” is 
a 32-character string of numbers and letters that serves as the “digital 
finger print” for the file. When the hash values of two files are the same, 
there is a sufficiently high statistical improbability of such a result 
occurring randomly that the two digital files are likely to be identical. 
The relationship between a hash value and its data set compares roughly 




Hash values are especially useful for the police when searching for 
images of child pornography. The police maintain an extensive database 
of the hash values of digital files previously deemed child pornography; 
and the police have access to similar databases maintained by other 
police forces, including those outside Canada. Thus, the police are able 
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to search a computer for images of child pornography simply by 
searching the hash values of files in a computer and looking for matches 
with those in its databases.
74
 They do not have to open each and every 
image file in the computer and can therefore avoid inadvertent exposure to 
all manner of private information such as intimate family photographs.
75
  
As one judge has said, new technologies may “give rise to new exigencies”, 
but they also give rise to “new capabilities”.
76
 
This is not to say that searching by way of file headers and hash tags 
is foolproof — or that the police should always be limited to these 
forensic tools.
77
 It is simply to suggest that the courts should be cautious 
about accepting the categorical claims of law enforcement that it will 
always be necessary to examine every file in the computer because the 
true nature of files may be concealed. Such claims are inaccurate because 
the police will often, although not always, have the technological tools to 
defeat such attempts at concealment. Moreover, such claims may be 
baseless where the target of the search is an innocent third party as 
opposed to a suspect. Even if such parties are able to conceal files, there 
is no reason to think that they will.
78
 
If the police are always allowed to examine every file on a computer 
to determine its relevance, informational privacy will be obliterated. In 
Little, for example, the reviewing officer examined 13,000 files on the 
accused’s computer to determine whether each of these files fell within 
the parameters of the warrant.
79
 On most personal computers, this would 
include e-mails, Internet browsing history, instant messages, contacts, 
calendar appointments, photographs, videos, music audio files, and 
business, financial and medical records. The vast majority of these files 
would fall outside the parameters of the warrant; thus, the police would 
have had no grounds to review this information. To allow the police to 
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access all of this information is to permit the police to sidestep the 
protections of section 8 of the Charter. This outcome is constitutionally 
intolerable. 
In an attempt to offset the invasive nature of this search, the Court in 
Little added that while the officer’s approach would be reasonable only if 
each file was “looked at cursorily to determine whether it [falls] within 
the parameters of the warrant”; in other words, the reviewing officer 
must immediately close any file that falls outside of these parameters.
80
 
There are at least three problems, however, with reliance on the cursory 
search standard to protect informational privacy. 
First, as one commentator has noted, “if officers are allowed to 
cursorily examine the contents of each file in order to determine if a 
given document is within the scope of the warrant, an individual’s 
protection depends upon police officers policing themselves”.
81
  
Second, even if one assumes that the police will always make a 
conscientious, good faith attempt to review each file no longer than 
absolutely necessary, the “cursory” search standard is unacceptably 
vague. The case law has, to date, been unable to provide any meaningful 
guidance as to where the line between cursory and non-cursory should be 
drawn. (In Sonne, for instance, all the Court could say is that the standard 
was met where the reviewing officer “flipped through” the files on the 
computer.
82
) And, this standard may well be eliminated when the 
Supreme Court of Canada considers it in the different context of 
searching a cell phone incident to arrest in Fearon.
83
 Both the appellant 
and the respondent in Fearon have argued against the cursory search 
standard, calling it “impractical”
84




Third, the cursory search standard becomes meaningless if the plain 
view doctrine is applied in the computer search context as the Court of 
Appeal contemplated in R. v. Jones. If the police are entitled to review 
every single file — even if only cursorily — to determine whether it falls 
within the parameters of the warrant, then every such file will fall into 
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“plain view” and be subject to seizure.
86
 In other words, the police will 
always be in a lawful position from which to view (and seize) evidence 




Accordingly, the courts should examine the facts of each case with 
great care — hopefully with the assistance of expert evidence and careful 
cross-examinations — to determine whether and when the police can 
legitimately claim that the danger of concealed files justifies the 
examination of every file on the computer. Such an approach should be 
the exception and not the rule. Just as the police cannot resort to the 
drastic measure of “dynamic entry” (i.e., entering a residence with a 
battering ram) absent evidence of a possibility of violence,
88
 the police 
should not be able to resort to the drastic measure of reviewing every file 
on a computer absent evidence of a file concealment that cannot 
otherwise be defeated.
89
 Where the technological tools exist to allow the 
police to conduct a more surgical and less invasive search, they should be 
required to use them.  
3.  Search Protocols: When Will They Be Imposed? 
The foregoing discussion is premised on the statement in Vu that 
manner of search is generally reviewed after the fact.
90
 The Court did, 
however, hold out the possibility that issuing justices may find it 
“necessary and practical” to impose search protocols (i.e., ex ante 
conditions) for computer searches in certain cases.
91
 The Court also made 
it clear that it was not “foreclos[ing] the possibility that our developing 
understanding of computer searches and changes in technology may 
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make it appropriate to impose search protocols in a broader range of 
cases in the future”.
92
 
In what sorts of cases can we expect to see search protocols 
imposed? And, how will they look when they are imposed? The Court 
gave two examples in Vu: cases involving “confidential intellectual 
property or potentially privileged information”.
93
 The latter provides a 
helpful starting point for an analysis of how search protocols should be 
designed. 
Search protocols already exist for cases involving potentially 
privileged information — both for physical world searches and computer 
searches. In Lavallee, Rackel & Heintz v. Canada (Attorney General),
94
 
the Supreme Court of Canada set out a number of rules to govern the 
legality of searches of law offices. These include:  
(1) Before searching a law office, the investigative authorities must 
satisfy the issuing justice that there exists no other reasonable 
alternative to the search.  
(2) Except when the warrant specifically authorizes the immediate 
examination, copying and seizure of an identified document, all 
documents in possession of a lawyer must be sealed before being 
examined or removed from the lawyer’s possession. 
(3) Every effort must be made to contact the lawyer and the client at the 
time of the execution of the search warrant. 
(4) Where the lawyer or the client cannot be contacted, a representative of 
the Bar should be allowed to oversee the sealing and seizure of 
documents. 
(5) If notification of potential privilege holders is not possible, the 
lawyer who had custody of the documents seized, or another lawyer 
appointed either by the Law Society or by the court, should 
examine the documents to determine whether a claim of privilege 
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Following Lavallee, the Law Society of Upper Canada adopted a 
set of guidelines for lawyers to follow when their offices become the 
targets of search warrants.
96
 These guidelines were recently 
implemented in the computer search context in Law Society of Upper 
Canada.
97
 In that case, the police executed a search warrant for child 
pornography in an investigation against a criminal defence lawyer in 
Timmins, Ontario.
98
 The Crown, the Law Society and the accused 
agreed on the following search protocol to protect solicitor-client 
privilege: 
(1) An Examiner (i.e., a forensic computer specialist) was to be appointed 
to conduct forensic procedures on the seized devices to enable the 
police and the Crown to obtain relevant evidence (the non-privileged 
graphic images of alleged child pornography). 
(2) A Referee, a lawyer whose role is to assist the Court in ensuring that 
the procedure followed for searching the seized devices maximally 
protects solicitor-client privilege, was to be appointed. 
(3) The Examiner was to create an EnCase forensic image of the 
physical drive from each original computer. 
(4) The Examiner was to conduct further forensic searching of the 
EnCase images instead of working directly with the contents of the 
actual seized devices in order to preserve the integrity of the contents 
of the seized devices. 
(5) The forensic investigation was to take place with the use of certain 
programs which “tease out” child pornography without the need to 
view privileged files: e.g., the Examiner was to extract all digital 
files from each EnCase forensic image using C4P and C4M. The 
offensive material would be stored in an external storage device to be 
sealed pending a Crown application to unseal. 
(6) The Examiner, with the assistance of the Referee, was to determine 
whether there were any privileged client files on the EnCase forensic 
images. If such privileged files were located, the Examiner was to  
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determine that no offensive materials were commingled among the 
privileged files and to copy the privileged files to a separate external 
storage device. 
(7) The Examiner was to file with the Court a report chronicling his work.
99
 
Among other things, this protocol is notable for the interposition of a 
neutral and detached third party between the investigating officers and 
the target of the warrant. Search protocols aimed at limiting search 
methodologies (e.g., restricting the police to certain file types or 
keywords) have been criticized on the basis that a search “can be as 
much art as a science”
100
 and that issuing justices “cannot get a sense of 
the exigencies that will unfold at each stage of the search process”.
101
 
None of this criticism, however, impugns the interposition of a neutral 
and detached third party. The investigating officers can communicate the 
objectives of the warrant to the third party and then defer to the third 
party’s judgment as to how best to pursue these objectives. So long as the 
third party has the necessary technical expertise, there will be no 
detriment to the investigation. There will, however, be an important 
advantage for informational privacy. Neutral and detached third parties 
are more likely to exercise restraint because they are not “engaged in the 
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime”.
102
 They are less 
likely to overlook important forensic tools that allow them to conduct 
less invasive and more surgical searches, and they have less incentive to 
engage in general exploratory searches of the computer’s contents for 
evidence falling outside the parameters of the warrant.
103
 
One expects that law enforcement will resist any requirement for a 
neutral and detached third party because it narrows their investigative 
discretion and can be costly. For the same reasons, the courts are unlikely 
to find that such an approach is constitutionally required in every 
computer search case. One can make a compelling argument, however, 
that this sort of search protocol should be required in an exceptional 
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group of computer search cases in which privacy risks are heightened — 
whether because of the quantity or quality of information stored on the 
computers, or the extent of commingling between the incriminating 
evidence that the police expect to find and innocent but highly personal 
information that the police have no right to see. In addition to cases 
involving potentially privileged information, three categories of cases 
come to mind. 
First, a neutral and detached third party may be required for searches 
involving confidential intellectual property. In Vu, the Supreme Court 
emphasized this as one category of information (along with potentially 
privileged information) that might require ex ante conditions to limit the 
scope of a computer search before it occurs.
104
 Lower courts should build 
on this statement as the law develops. 
Second, a neutral and detached third party may be required for 
searches involving networks of computers. As the Supreme Court noted 
in Vu, computers are rarely stand-alone, self-contained entities. They are 
often connected to networks or servers which link them to other 
computers.
105
 The problem of intermingling and the consequential risk of 
over-seizure are exacerbated in this context.
106
 In large companies, for 
instance, thousands of computers are connected to each other across 
cities, countries and continents via company network servers. These 
computer users share disk drives. If the police are allowed to search these 
networks without the oversight of a neutral third party, they could 
potentially comb through the private information of thousands of 
innocent people before they discover any evidence falling within the 
parameters of their warrant.  
Consider the facts of United States of America v. Equinix Inc.
107
 The 
United States was investigating Megaupload (a company that ran online 
file storage and viewing services) for criminal infringement of copyright, 
conspiracy to infringe copyright, money laundering and racketeering. To 
assist the United States with its investigation, the Attorney General of 
Canada seized 32 computer servers from Megaupload’s Canadian office 
and applied for an order under section 15 of the Mutual Legal Assistance 
in Criminal Matters Act
108
 to send mirror-imaged copies of all 32 servers 
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to the United States. The volume of data on these servers was the 
equivalent of that contained on 100 laptop computers. The Court found 
that “it is likely that the volume and breadth of data relevant to the 
prosecution as a whole is enormous”.
109
 Nevertheless, the Court declined 
to order all 32 servers to be sent to the United States; instead, it held that 
a more refined order was needed. The Court left it to the parties to decide 
how the scope of relevant material should be defined, subject to the 
matter being brought back to the Court if the parties could not agree.
110
 
The interposition of the Court in the process of identifying the 
information that the state should be allowed to review is analogous to a 
requirement for a neutral and detached third party to oversee the 
execution of a search warrant. 
Third, a neutral and detached third party may be required for 
searches aimed at innocent parties.
111
 Search warrants are not always 
obtained to search the computers of a suspect; they can also be obtained 
to search the computers of innocent parties, so long as there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that such computers contain evidence of 
crime. The best example of this may be United States v. Comprehensive 
Drug Testing.
112
 There, the U.S. government conducted an investigation 
into the use of steroids by professional baseball players. The 
government obtained warrants to seize the drug-testing records of 10 
named players from Comprehensive Drug Testing Inc. (“CDT”), a 
private company that administered anonymous drug testing services. In 
executing the warrant, however, the government seized the computers 
of the CDT and ended up reviewing the drug testing records of 
hundreds of players and many other people who had no connection to 
the investigation.
113
 The state would not have been exposed to this 
highly personal information had the search been conducted by a neutral 
and detached third party.  
The above examples focus on exceptional situations in which the 
privacy interests are even greater than they are in the ordinary 
computer search case — and, therefore, where the need for search 
protocols is enhanced. This, however, should not be taken to suggest 
that similar protocols should never be required when the police target 
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their search at a single computer. Indeed, there may be good reason to 
insist that such searches should always be conducted by an officer 
with special training in computer forensics and who is otherwise 
uninvolved in the investigation. Such an officer would not be a 
neutral and detached third party in the sense of being outside law 
enforcement, but he or she would at least be one step removed from 
the investigation. This procedure was followed in R. v. Blazevic, and 





The law of computer search and seizure is still in its infancy. The 
Supreme Court of Canada has answered some basic questions in Morelli 
(computer searches are invasive), Cole (warrants are required to search 
both personal and work computers) and Vu (warrants must specifically 
authorize a computer search). These decisions address the first 
prophylactic rule under section 8 of the Charter (i.e., the requirement of 
prior authorization) in the computer search context. Now it is time to 
address the second rule that the manner of search must be reasonable — 
and this is where the hard work begins. 
Developing manner of search law is challenging in the computer 
context because computer searches are driven by technology, which is 
constantly evolving. Thus, the imposition of overly specific rules 
enhances the risk of error. Such rules can unfairly limit the ability 
of the police to discover evidence that they have been authorized 
to seize, on the one hand, or overlook the ability of the police to 
conduct surgical searches that minimize the invasion of privacy, on the 
other hand.  
This paper has attempted to focus on the general principles that can 
be extrapolated from the emerging case law and that can point the way 
forward while retaining the necessary flexibility to adapt to technological 
advances. These include the following propositions: 
(1) The courts should carefully examine the methodology used by the 
police to determine whether they were faithful to the objectives of 
the warrant in their execution of the search. 
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(2) The courts should resist categorical claims that every file on a computer 
must be examined, even if only cursorily, to determine its relevance. 
(3) The courts should require search protocols to be set out in the warrant  
in certain cases involving heightened privacy risks (e.g., searches 
involving potentially privileged information and confidential intellectual 
property; searches aimed at networks of computers; and searches 
targeting innocent parties).  
A proper balance between the interests of law enforcement and the 
privacy rights of individuals is critical in a free and democratic society. 
In the foreseeable future, this tension will manifest itself most 
significantly in computer searches. The Supreme Court of Canada has 
taken important steps to shore up the requirement of prior authorization 
in this context. The most important work, however, remains to be done. 
The courts must continue to focus on the many unique features of 
computers outlined in Vu as they develop new rules to regulate the 
manner of computer searches. Only this will ensure the continuing 
relevance of section 8 of the Charter in the digital age. 
 
 
